Two years after the guns supposedly fell silent in northern Ethiopia, Addis Ababa is still pointing fingers at Tigrayan forces and rival factions for holding the country back from actual stability.
It sounds like standard political deflection. Honestly, it's way more complicated than a simple blame game between old enemies. When an advisor to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed publicly warns that Tigrayan forces and other armed groups are actively hindering stability, they aren't just venting frustration to the press—they're signaling that the Pretoria Agreement is straining under the weight of unfinished business. Read more on a similar issue: this related article.
If you've been following Horn of Africa politics over the last decade, you know peace deals on paper rarely match reality on the ground. Let's break down what Addis Ababa is actually saying, why the "others" mentioned in those warnings matter just as much as the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and what's really blocking Ethiopia from moving forward.
The Core Accusation From Addis Ababa
The message coming out of the Prime Minister's office is straightforward. Senior officials, including national security and political advisors to Abiy Ahmed, have repeatedly argued that lasting peace remains out of reach because key armed actors haven't fully honored their end of the bargain. Additional reporting by Associated Press delves into comparable views on the subject.
At the center of this friction is the November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, better known as the Pretoria Agreement. That deal ended a brutal two-year war that killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions. Under its terms, Tigrayan forces agreed to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into federal structures, while Addis Ababa agreed to restore basic services, lift restrictions, and respect the region's interim administration.
Here's the problem. Disarmament didn't happen cleanly.
While heavy weaponry was handed over early on, tens of thousands of fighters remain in limbo. Federal advisors argue that retaining organized military structures outside federal command directly undermines state authority. From their perspective, you can't build national stability when regional factions still hold onto armed leverage.
Why "And Others" Is Doing Heavy Lifting Here
Most international headlines fixate exclusively on Tigray. That's a mistake. Look closely at the phrasing from Abiy's advisors—"Tigrayan forces and others hinder stability"—and you see the real headache facing the federal government.
Ethiopia isn't dealing with a single localized dispute anymore. It's juggling multiple overlapping insurgencies across its two largest regions, Amhara and Oromia.
The Amhara Fallout and Fano Militias
During the Tigray war, Amhara regional forces and loose nationalist militias known as Fano fought alongside the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). Then came the Pretoria deal. Many Amhara leaders felt betrayed, believing Addis Ababa cut a deal with the TPLF without resolving disputed territories like Western Tigray (which Amhara forces had seized during the war).
When the federal government tried to dissolve regional special forces in April 2023 to centralize security, Amhara erupted. Fano militias turned their guns on federal troops, plunging the region into a grinding insurgency that continues to disrupt trade, banking, and civilian life.
The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)
Meanwhile, in Oromia—the country's most populous region and Abiy's own home base—the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has waged a years-long guerrilla campaign. Peace talks held in Tanzania collapsed without a deal. Kidnappings, highway blockades, and localized clashes have made vast stretches of Oromia dangerous for ordinary citizens and commercial trucks alike.
So when an advisor lumps Tigrayan forces together with "others," they're acknowledging a grim reality. Addis Ababa is fighting fires on three fronts at once, and each faction feeds off the instability created by the others.
What Most People Get Wrong About the Pretoria Agreement
A common misconception outside Ethiopia is that the Pretoria Agreement solved the conflict and everything happening now is just minor post-war housekeeping. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The Pretoria deal was a ceasefire mechanism, not a political settlement. It kicked the hardest questions down the road so the killing would stop immediately. Three massive landmines were left buried beneath the text:
- Contested Territories: Both Tigray and Amhara claim fertile borderlands like Welkait and Raya. The agreement said these disputes would be resolved through constitutional processes, likely a referendum. Neither side trusts the other to run a fair vote, and hundreds of thousands of displaced Tigrayans still can't go home.
- Internal TPLF Splits: Tigray itself isn't a monolith anymore. A bitter power struggle has fractured the TPLF between old-guard hardliners led by Debretsion Gebremichael and the interim administration headed by Getachew Reda. When Addis Ababa accuses Tigrayan forces of obstructing stability, it's often targeting the hardline faction that refuses to cede control or accelerate demobilization.
- Eritrea's Shadow: Eritrean troops fought alongside Ethiopian forces during the war and committed widespread atrocities. Relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa have since soured dramatically, leaving Eritrean forces lingering along border areas and complicating any security arrangement in northern Ethiopia.
You can't separate these pieces. If Addis Ababa pushes too hard on Tigrayan disarmament, it risks triggering another northern war. If it drags its feet, Amhara militias scream favoritism and escalate their own attacks.
The Economic Toll Nobody Can Ignore
Politics aside, this prolonged instability is choking Ethiopia's economy. Before 2020, Ethiopia was one of Africa's fastest-growing economies, attracting major manufacturing and infrastructure investment. Today, inflation remains stubbornly high, foreign currency reserves have been stretched thin, and the government had to secure a massive $3.4 billion financing package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) alongside painful currency reforms.
Investors don't care which faction started which skirmish. They care whether trucks can drive from Djibouti to Addis Ababa without getting ambushed, and whether regional administrations have predictable rules.
Every time federal officials and regional armed groups trade accusations, debt restructuring talks get harder and reconstruction money stays frozen. Billions of dollars needed to rebuild destroyed schools, hospitals, and power grids in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar remain tied up while donors wait to see if peace will actually stick.
What Needs to Happen Next to Break the Deadlock
Blaming armed groups might explain the symptoms, yet it won't cure the disease. If Ethiopia is going to move past constant crisis management, several concrete steps have to happen on the ground—not just in press briefings.
- Accelerate DDR With Real Economic Alternatives: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) fails when ex-fighters are handed a bus ticket and zero job prospects. International partners and federal agencies need to fund vocational programs and agricultural grants directly tied to verified weapon handovers.
- Launch Credible, Inclusive National Dialogue: Ethiopia's National Dialogue Commission has struggled to gain legitimacy because major armed actors—including Fano and the OLA—aren't at the table. Without bringing armed opposition groups into a structured political process, military operations will just keep recycling grievances.
- Set a Clear Timeline for Disputed Zones: Leaving Western Tigray and Raya in permanent administrative limbo guarantees future violence. Federal authorities, regional leaders, and neutral observers must establish an interim security framework that allows displaced civilians to return safely before any referendum takes place.
- De-escalate Factional Infighting in Tigray: Regional leaders in Mekelle have to resolve their internal leadership crisis through political channels rather than mobilizing rival armed units. A fractured Tigray makes implementation of the Pretoria deal practically impossible.
Ethiopia stands at a crossroads where rhetoric from Addis Ababa reflects genuine security anxiety, even if it leaves out the federal government's own missteps in managing regional autonomy. Until armed actors across Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia are brought into a binding political settlement—and until fighters have a reason to put down their rifles for good—stability will remain a talking point rather than a reality.